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Abstract	
Our	contribution	analyses	the	influence	of	electoral	campaigning	on	candidates’	success	at	the	
2015	Swiss	elections	to	the	National	Council.	Concretely,	we	ask	whether	and	to	what	extent	the	
intensity	and	content	of	a	candidate’s	campaign	exerts	a	persuasive	effect	on	voters.	In	doing	so,	
we	make	use	of	a	rather	unique	setting	embedded	in	the	open‐list	PR‐system	of	Switzerland,	
namely	allowing	voters	not	only	to	duplicate	candidates	from	a	chosen	list	(cumulation)	but	also	
to	add	candidates	from	other	parties	and	lists	to	their	selected	list	(panachage).	Using	the	
amount	of	votes	a	candidate	received	from	voters	favoring	other	parties	or	lists	gives	us	an	idea	
about	a	candidate’s	persuasive	potential	to	gain	votes	outside	his	classical	voter	segment.	We	
assess	a	candidate’s	campaign	based	on	a	collection	of	almost	4,000	political	advertisements	
gathered	in	50	important	supraregional	and	regional	newspapers	covering	all	26	cantons,	i.e.	
electoral	districts.	The	influence	of	the	electoral	campaign	is	examined	using	hierarchical	
models,	by	modelling	a	candidate’s	electoral	success	for	each	ballot	list	in	his	district.	This	
procedure	bears	the	advantage	that	we	are	in	a	better	position	to	model	the	votes	of	an	
individual	candidate	in	relation	to	the	alternatives	a	voter	was	offered	on	other	party	lists.	We	
find	that	the	form	as	well	as	the	intensity	of	electoral	campaigning	matter	for	electoral	success	in	
terms	of	both,	votes	gained	from	cumulation	as	well	as	votes	gained	from	panachage.	In	contrast	
to	findings	from	other	open‐list	PR‐systems,	we	find	that	challengers	profit	substantially	more	
from	electoral	campaigning	than	incumbents	do.		
	
	 	
																																																													
1	The	order	of	authors	has	been	determined	by	throwing	the	dice.	
Introduction	
The	principle	of	selecting	representatives	by	citizens	via	popular	elections	lies	at	the	very	heart	
of	representative	democracies.	In	most	of	the	cases,	the	choice	of	the	candidates	is	determined	
by	the	party	a	voter	decides	to	support.	Yet	in	some	–	and	mostly	European	–	democracies,	
citizens	also	have	the	possibility	to	vote	for	candidates	of	their	choice,	within	or	even	across	
party	lists.	As	a	consequence,	candidate‐specific	factors	become	more	important	for	electoral	
success	in	multimember	districts	that	allow	for	the	so	called	“preferential	voting”	compared	to	
districts	that	do	not	(e.g.,	Sartori	1976;	Katz	1986;	Carey	and	Shugart	1995;	Karvonen	2004;	
Shugart	et	al.	2005).		
Since	voters	demand	more	information	on	a	candidate	when	they	are	allowed	to	choose	from	a	
larger	set	of	candidates,	researchers	started	to	examine	the	effect	of	candidate	specific	factors	
such	as	local	ties	and	lower‐level	political	experience	(e.g.,	Shugart	et	al.	2005;	Tavits	2010;	Put	
and	Maddens	2015),	incumbency	(e.g.,	Moon	2006;	Maddens	and	Put	2013),	a	candidate’s	
position	on	the	list	(e.g.,	Lutz	2010;	Wauters	et	al.	2010),	his	media	presence	(van	Aelst	et	al.	
2008;	Elmelund	and	Hopmann	2012)	and	the	electoral	campaign	(e.g.,	Bowler	et	al.	1996;	
Maddens	et	al.	2006;	Maddens	and	Put	2013;	Spierings	and	Jacobs	2014)	on	electoral	outcomes	
in	preferential	vote	systems.		
While	most	of	these	factors	are	predefined	by	a	candidates	curriculum	vitae,	a	candidate	still	has	
the	possibility	to	promote	himself	and	his	capabilities	via	electoral	campaigning	–	something	
which	is	often	made	use	of	in	systems	knowing	preferential	voting	(Katz	1986:	101;	Karvonen	
2004).	Up	to	now,	however,	evidence	about	whether	“efforts	to	cultivate	personal	vote	pay	off”	
(Tavits	2010:	216)	is	inconclusive	(see,	e.g.,	Bowler	et	al.	1996;	Maddens	et	al.	2006;	Elmelund	
and	Hopmann	2012;	Spierings	and	Jacobs	2014).	Furthermore,	the	impact	of	campaign	activities	
is	likely	to	vary	across	countries	(Spierings	and	Jacobs	2014:	217‐18),	which	calls	for	more	
research	in	different	contexts.	
This	paper	analyses	the	impact	of	campaign	activities	on	preferential	voting	in	Switzerland	in	
the	framework	of	the	2015	general	elections	to	the	National	Council.	We	focus	on	Switzerland	
for	two	particular	reasons.	First,	we	make	use	of	a	unique	dataset	consisting	of	campaign	
advertisements	published	in	more	than	50	important	national	and	regional	newspapers	
(Bühlmann	et	al.	2015).	With	the	help	of	this	data,	we	are	not	only	in	a	position	to	examine	the	
impact	of	the	intensity	of	personal	campaigns,	but	also	the	effect	of	their	form	and	content.	
Second,	the	electoral	system	in	Switzerland	is	characterized	by	strong	preferential	voting	
(Karvonen	2004:	208).	In	most	of	the	countries	that	hold	a	certain	form	of	preferential	voting,	
only	candidates	from	the	same	party	(or	list)	can	be	chosen.2	Thus	the	party	choice	has	a	very	
predominant	role,	implying	that	voters	look	at	candidates’	attributes	only	after	having	chosen	a	
preferred	party	or	list.	This	is	different	in	Switzerland:	Swiss	voters	can	1)	cumulate	a	candidate,	
i.e.	put	him	twice	on	a	list	(mostly	implying	that	another	candidate	needs	to	be	deleted	from	the	
list),	and	2)	and	most	relevant	for	the	aim	of	our	investigation	–	include	candidates	from	another	
party	or	list	onto	the	chosen	list	(so	called	panachage	and	again	implying	the	exclusion	of	a	
candidate	from	a	chosen	list).	This	together	with	the	fact	that,	after	determining	the	amount	of	
seats	a	party	receives,	the	distribution	of	seats	is	dictated	by	the	sum	of	individual	candidates’	
votes,	is	likely	to	present	strong	incentives	for	personal	vote‐seeking	behaviour	(Selb	and	Lutz	
2015;	see	also	Shugart	et	al.	2005).	Moreover,	this	particularity	allows	us	to	examine	potential	
and	unexplored	differences	in	the	impact	of	campaigning	between	“loyal”	preferential	votes,	i.e.	
the	cumulation	of	a	candidate	from	a	chosen	list,	and	“alien”	preferential	votes,	i.e.	the	panachage	
of	candidates	from	other	than	the	chosen	list.	
The	subsequent	sections	of	the	paper	are	organized	as	follows.	In	the	next	section,	we	discuss	
expectations	for	the	impact	of	electoral	campaigns	on	personal	votes.	Subsequently,	we	describe	
the	data	as	well	as	the	method	(section	3)	we	used	in	our	analyses,	which	is	what	we	present	in	
section	4,	before	we	discuss	the	implications	of	our	findings	and	conclude.	
	
Campaign	effects	
Broadly	speaking,	there	are	two	systems	for	parliamentary	elections:	the	majority	and	plurality	
versus	the	proportional	electoral	system.	The	main	aim	of	the	first	type	is	the	selection	of	the	
most	qualified	candidate	in	single‐member	districts.	This	winner‐take‐all‐method	leads	to	the	
emergence	of	two‐party	systems;	with	strong	incentives	for	voters	to	choose	among	candidates	
of	two	strong	parties	that	hold	adequate	chances	to	gain	a	seat	(Duverger	1959).	In	this	
situation,	a	pluralistic	society	is	only	badly	represented.	Adequate	representation	of	such	
societal	plurality	is	the	basic	aim	of	the	proportional	representation	system	where	voters	have	to	
choose	between	several	parties	representing	different	ideas.	In	this	system	it	is	the	parties	that	
nominate	candidates	on	their	lists	and	candidate	voting	is	less	pronounced	than	in	majority	and	
plurality	systems.		
Yet	the	candidates	that	the	parties	put	on	the	top	of	their	lists	may	differ	from	voters’	
preferences	(Katz	1997;	Farell	2011).	While	in	most	countries	with	proportional	representation	
																																																													
2	Leaning	on	Karvonen	(2004)	we	can	differentiate	two	types	of	list	proportional	representation	systems:	
in	systems	where	you	can	only	choose	the	preferred	party	and	put	their	list	into	the	ballot	box	(closed	
list),	candidate‐centered	voting	is	of	low	importance.	However,	there	are	also	systems	allowing	voters	to	
influence	which	candidates	will	represent	them	(open	or	free	list).	Different	rules	allow	for	a	ranking	of	
the	candidates	on	the	list	(e.g.	Ireland),	for	giving	so	called	preference	votes	for	specific	candidates	on	a	
list	(e.g.	Belgium)	or	allowing	for	freely	choosing	several	candidates	from	a	party	list	(e.g.	Finland).		
system,	voters	are	simply	allowed	to	choose	their	preferred	party	and	put	their	list	into	the	
ballot	box	(closed	list	systems),	in	some	countries	there	are	rules	giving	the	voters	some	
influence	on	the	choice	of	the	candidates.	Such	open	list	electoral	systems	try	to	combine	the	
advantages	of	majoritarian	and	representational	systems	allowing	for	party	as	well	as	candidate	
choice,	i.e.	an	ideological	as	well	as	a	personal	representation.		
In	their	path	breaking	work,	Carey	and	Shugart	(1995)	argued	that	in	such	an	open	list	electoral	
system,	candidates	have	strong	incentives	to	orient	their	campaign	towards	their	own	
reputation.	If	voters	have	the	possibility	to	decide	on	candidates,	they	ask	for	information	about	
the	candidates.	Thus,	“candidates	may	attract	support	for	who	they	are,	or	what	they	have	done,	
or	what	they	might	do,	rather	than	simply	because	of	the	party	to	which	they	belong”	(Marsh	
2007:	501).	Several	studies	showed	that	candidate‐centred	factors	are	indeed	important	
compared	to	mere	party‐centred	factors	(Karvonen	2004;	Marsh	2007;	Moser	&	Scheiner	2005;	
Shugart	et	al.	2005;	Swindle	2002).	
The	follow‐up	question	is:	which	candidate	specific	factors	have	an	influence	on	electoral	
outcomes?	Research	on	this	question	highlights	the	impact	of	local	ties	and	lower‐level	political	
experience	(e.g.,	Shugart	et	al.	2005;	Tavits	2010;	Put	and	Maddens	2015),	incumbency	(e.g.,	
Moon	2006;	Maddens	and	Put	2013),	a	candidate’s	position	on	the	list	(e.g.,	Lutz	2010;	Wauters	
et	al.	2010)	or	his	media	presence	(van	Aelst	et	al.	2008;	Elmelund	and	Hopmann	2012)	on	
electoral	success	(for	a	discussion	on	the	assumed	effects	of	these	factors	see	below).		
Besides	having	an	interesting	curriculum,	a	candidate	can	also	promote	himself	by	campaigning.	
Campaign	spending	is	an	important	way	to	enhance	a	candidate’s	visibility	vis	à	vis	the	
electorate.	Several	studies	found	a	positive	impact	of	campaign	spending	on	electoral	outcome	
(e.g.,	Maddens	et	al.	2006;	Maddens	and	Put	2013;	Spierings	and	Jacobs	2014;	however,	see	
Bowler	et	al.	1996;	Elmelund‐Praestekaer	and	Hopmann	2012	for	counter‐evidence).	
Furthermore,	this	effect	might	be	stronger	for	challengers,	since	voters	are	less	or	not	at	all	
familiar	with	new	candidates	than	they	are	with	incumbents.	Thus,	in	the	latter	case,	the	
“marginal	return	of	campaign	expenses	should	be	lower	than	for	challengers,	who	have	to	gain	
visibility	during	the	campaign	and	can	only	do	so	through	spending”	(Maddens	&	Put	2013:	
853).	This	relationship	has	repeatedly	been	demonstrated	in	the	U.S.	(e.g.,	Abramowitz	1991;	
Jacobson	1978;	Moon	2006).	On	the	other	hand,	Maddens	et	al.	(2006)	could	not	detect	such	an	
effect	in	Belgium	with	its	proportional	electoral	system	and	semi‐open	list.	Maddens	and	Put	
(2013:	853)	hypothesize	that	in	proportional	list	systems	with	large	constituencies	–	the	
average	Belgium	constituency	counts	13.6	seats	–	the	incumbent	MPs	are	not	as	well‐known	as	
the	ones	in	smaller	constituencies	or	in	majoritarian	systems	with	single‐member	districts.	Since	
in	large	constituencies,	it	is	more	difficult	for	voters	to	recall	all	their	incumbents,	the	campaign	
effect	between	incumbent	and	challengers	is	likely	to	diminish	in	larger	constituencies.	On	
average,	the	26	Swiss	constituencies	are,	with	7.7	seats	per	constituency,	of	smaller	size	than	the	
Belgium	ones.3		
However,	in	our	contribution	we	do	not	solely	focus	on	the	amount	of	campaign	expenses.	We	
rely	on	a	unique	dataset	consisting	of	campaign	advertisements	published	in	more	than	50	
important	national	and	regional	newspapers	(Bühlmann	et	al.	2015).	With	the	help	of	this	data,	
we	aim	at	testing	the	effect	of	the	visibility,	the	uniqueness	and	the	local	anchoring	of	a	
candidate’s	campaign	on	his	electoral	outcome.	In	Switzerland,	candidates	are	not	obliged	to	
disclose	their	funding,	which	is	why	we	have	to	rely	on	other	measures	of	campaigning.	
Although	we	agree	that	other	campaigning	strategies	such	as	advertising	in	social	media	gain	in	
importance,	people	still	pay	much	more	attention	to	political	advertisements	in	print	media	than	
to	web	pages	concerning	the	elections	(Selects	2011).4	In	the	following,	we	argue	that	it	is	not	
only	the	campaign	expenses,	i.e.	a	mere	exposure	effect	that	matter	but	also	the	strategy	as	well	
as	the	content	of	a	candidate’s	campaign.	To	attract	(alien)	voters,	a	candidate	must	be	visible,	he	
must	show	that	he	is	different	from	other	candidates	and	he	must	prove	connectedness	with	his	
constituents.		
Visibility	increases	eligibility:	Candidates	that	are	more	present	during	the	campaign	have	a	
comparative	advantage	over	candidates	that	do	not	present	themselves	–	independent	of	the	
content	of	their	campaign.	First,	they	increase	their	visibility	among	the	voters	and	second,	they	
might	profit	from	a	mere	repeated	exposure	effect,	i.e.	from	the	mechanism	that	repeated	
exposure	to	a	stimulus	increases	its	accessibility	to	the	individual’s	perception	(Zajonc	1968:	1).	
Such	an	effect	is	particularly	prone	when	individual	voters	pursue	a	low‐cost	information	
strategy	and	rely	on	cues	presented	to	them	(e.g.,	Moons	et	al.	2009,	see	also	Steenbergen	2010).	
Furthermore,	visibility	can	be	increased	by	clever	‘product	placement’	(e.g.,	Geise	&	
Brettschneider	2010).	A	coloured	advertisement	on	the	front	page	of	a	newspaper	for	example	is	
supposed	to	attract	more	attention	than	a	black‐white	designed	advertisement	on	the	
advertorial	page	in	the	last	part	of	the	newspaper.		
In	order	to	capture	a	mere	exposure	effect,	we	take	the	frequency	of	ads	published	per	
candidate.	Furthermore,	we	include	variables	that	capture	the	visibility	of	a	candidate’s	
campaign.	These	are	the	proportion	of	a	candidate’s	ads	published	on	the	first	page	of	a	bundled	
newspaper	and	the	proportion	of	ads	printed	in	colour.	
																																																													
3	Yet	the	range	in	the	Swiss	constituencies	is	quite	substantial:	six	out	of	26	cantons	have	more	than	10	
seats,	two	of	them	more	than	20	(Bern	25;	Zurich	35).		
4	In	Switzerland,	electoral	campaigning	on	television	and	radio	is	not	allowed.	
Individualized	campaigning	helps	to	stand	out:	A	candidate	aiming	at	attracting	voters	that	do	not	
intend	to	vote	for	his	party	should	show	some	degree	of	independence.	Of	course	there	is	a	fine	
line	between	attracting	alien	voters	and	scaring	off	the	own	followers.	However,	since	party	
cohesion	is	assumed	to	be	smaller	in	preferential	voting	systems	(Karvonen	2004	;	Katz	1986),	
showing	a	certain	amount	of	autonomy	can	help	to	win	elections.	A	candidate	can	demonstrate	
such	autonomy	by	conducting	a	highly	personalized	campaign,	i.e.	a	campaign	where	the	goal	is	
to	promote	the	candidate	instead	of	the	party	he	or	she	is	running	for	(see	e.g.,	Zittel	&	
Gschwend	2008;	Selb	&	Lutz	2015).	In	Switzerland,	candidates	are	often	supported	by	important	
associations.	We	argue	that	the	degree	to	which	a	candidate’s	campaign	was	externally	funded	–	
we	use	the	percentage	of	a	candidate’s	ads	where	this	is	the	case	–	accounts	for	the	degree	of	
independence	from	his	party.	A	candidate	funded	by	an	association	can	present	himself	in	a	
different	light	and	at	the	same	time	distance	himself	from	other	candidates	on	his	own	list.	As	an	
additional	measure,	we	include	the	proportion	of	ads	where	the	candidate	was	campaigning	
without	his	combatants,	assuming	that	advertising	together	with	several	candidates	from	the	
same	party	promotes	higher	party	unity	–	at	the	expense	of	single	candidates.	Additionally,	by	
showing	his	connection	with	an	important	association,	a	candidate	also	gains	in	uniqueness.		
Demonstrating	local	rootedness	pays	off:	Several	studies	demonstrate	the	importance	of	
candidates’	local‐level	political	characteristics	for	electoral	success	(Tavits	2010).	Local	ties	are	
seen	as	“a	crucial	personal	vote‐earning	attribute”	(Put	and	Maddens	2015:	608).	Occupying	a	
local	office	(Tavits	2010)	or	living	in	big	municipalities	(Put	and	Maddens	2015)	can	increase	the	
number	of	votes	a	candidate	gets.	Local	birthplace	and	local‐level	political	experience	are	signals	
for	familiarity	with	local	interests.	Therefore,	voters	seem	to	reward	candidates	with	local	roots.	
However,	we	argue	that	a	candidate	should	actively	demonstrate	the	strength	of	his	local	ties	
during	his	campaign	to	convince	even	more	voters	than	only	those	already	knowing	him.	To	
capture	whether	a	candidate’s	campaign	is	locally	rooted,	we	introduced	the	proportion	of	ads	
containing	one	or	more	testimonials	where	local	celebrities	promote	the	candidate.	
Furthermore,	we	use	the	proportion	of	ads	calling	attention	to	events	where	voters	were	able	to	
meet	the	candidate.	We	assume	that	real	contact	with	voters	has	a	high	potential	to	increase	a	
candidate’s	electoral	success	(Karvonen	2004).	
Of	course,	looking	at	the	content	rather	than	the	extent	of	campaigning	should	also	include	
negative	campaigning.	Negative	advertising	seems	to	grow	in	importance	(Geer	2006).	Providing	
voters	with	information	about	poor	characteristics	of	an	alien	candidate	can	be	an	instrument	to	
alienate	voters	from	the	candidate	suffering	from	negative	campaigning	(Fridkin	and	Kenney	
2011).	Yet	negative	campaigning	can	also	provoke	a	backlash	for	the	candidate	or	the	party	that	
sponsored	the	negative	promotion	(Brooks	and	Murov	2012;	Lau	et	al.	2007):	adherents	of	the	
negatively	advertised	candidate	get	motivated	to	support	him	even	more.	In	order	to	examine	
the	potential	effect	of	negative	campaigning,	we	include	a	binary	variable	capturing	whether	the	
candidate	has	been	a	victim	of	negative	campaigning	in	at	least	one	ad	published	in	the	forefront	
of	the	general	elections.		
Data	and	Method	
The	2015	general	elections	to	the	National	Council	in	Switzerland	
Switzerland	has	a	bicameral	legislature	and	popular	elections	taking	place	every	four	years,	with	
the	26	Swiss	(half‐)cantons	forming	the	districts.	While	in	the	Council	of	States,	each	full	canton	
gets	two	seats	and	each	of	the	former	six	half‐cantons	receives	one,	the	electoral	rule	applying	is	
–	with	two	exceptions	–	majoritarian.	Things	are	different	in	the	National	Council,	where	the	200	
seats	are	distributed	according	to	a	canton’s	population	size	using	a	proportional	list	formula	
(D’Hondt).	According	to	the	OSCE	(2012:	7),	the	Swiss	electoral	system	is	“unusually	complex,	
[but]	it	has	the	positive	effect	of	enhancing	voters’	choice”.	Its	free	list	system	gives	each	voter	as	
many	votes	as	there	are	seats	in	his	or	her	district	(between	1	and	35).	A	citizen	can	erase	names	
on	preprinted	lists,	vote	for	members	of	different	parties	or	lists	(panachage),	give	two	votes	to	a	
single	candidate	(cumulation)	—	and	can	do	all	of	this	at	the	same	time.	Voting	for	alien	
candidates	(panachage)	is	quite	popular:	in	the	2015	Swiss	elections,	5’756’035	votes	(from	a	
total	of	39’563’016	votes)	stemmed	from	panachage.	Already	at	the	national	elections	in	1975,	
Niemetz	(1977:	299)	detected	a	certain	“panachage	enthusiasm”	(Panaschierfreudigkeit),	which	
he	traced	back	to	a	stronger	personalization	of	the	votes	rather	than	the	loosening	of	party	ties.			
Thus,	the	Swiss	system	combines	quite	uniquely	the	advantage	of	majoritarian	electoral	systems	
aiming	at	selection	of	the	most	qualified	candidate	with	the	advantage	of	proportional	
representation	aiming	at	plural	representation.	This	gives	us	the	opportunity	to	test	the	impact	
of	candidates’	campaign	activities	on	both,	intra‐party	(i.e.	intra‐list	cumulation)	as	well	as	inter‐
party	competition	(i.e.	inter‐list	panachage).	In	this	paper,	we	undertake	an	exploratory	
approach	and	analyse	campaign	effects	on	both,	“loyal”	and	“alien”	preference	votes.	For	
instance,	one	could	assume	that	individualized	campaigns	increase	the	votes	a	candidate	
receives	from	alien	lists	but	not	necessarily	the	votes	that	she	receives	from	voters	who	chose	
her	own	party	list.	
For	our	purpose,	we	focus	on	the	20	cantons	that	dispose	of	more	than	one	seat	in	the	National	
Council,	since	the	act	of	cumulation	as	well	as	panachage	requires	the	possibility	to	vote	for	at	
least	two	candidates.	In	the	selected	cantons,	a	total	of	3788	candidates	were	running	on	422	
lists.	1001	out	of	these	candidates	(on	220	lists)	placed	at	least	one	campaign	ad	in	one	or	more	
newspapers	included	in	our	sample	between	January	1st	and	the	election	day	on	October	18th.		
Method	
In	order	to	examine	the	effect	of	campaign	activity	on	personal	votes	a	candidate	receives,	we	
ran	multilevel	models	with	random	intercepts.	Unlike	other	studies	which	used	the	Swiss	
panachage	statistics	(BFS	2016)	at	an	aggregate	level	(Lutz	2010),	i.e.	used	the	candidates’	total	
number	of	preference	votes	cast,	we	fully	exploit	the	data’s	potential	by	modelling	a	candidate’s	
electoral	success	for	each	ballot	list	in	his	district.	This	procedure	bears	the	advantage	that	we	
are	in	a	better	position	to	model	the	votes	of	an	individual	candidate	in	relation	to	the	
alternatives	a	voter	was	offered	on	other	party	lists.	Hence,	as	a	dependent	variable,	we	employ,	
on	the	one	hand,	the	degree	to	which	a	candidate	was	able	to	exploit	the	panachage	potential	of	a	
specific	list:		
	
Y௜௝ௗ ൌ ݈݋݃ ቀ ୮೔ೕଶ௕೏ቁ,	 (1a)	
	
where	pij	is	the	number	of	panachage	votes	obtained	by	candidate	i	on	list	j	and	bd	the	number	of	
valid	ballot	papers	for	a	list	d	≠	j.	Since	the	panachage	potential	is	heavily	skewed	towards	the	
right,	we	take	the	log	of	it.		
On	the	other	hand,	we	use	the	degree	to	which	a	candidate	was	able	to	realise	his	cumulation	
potential	as	a	dependent	variable,	which	corresponds	to	the	above	excluded	special	case	of	d	=	j:	
	
Y௜௝ ൌ ݈݋݃ ൬୮೔ೕଶ௕ೕ൰	 (2a)	
	
Our	focus	on	the	list‐specific	achievement	allows	us	to	control	for	some	crucial	characteristics	of	
the	origin	of	a	preferential	vote,	i.e.	a	specific	voter	segment,	and	thus	to	model	the	vote	decision	
more	accurately.	To	do	so,	we	need	to	account	for	the	fact	that	each	listj‐to‐listd‐combination	in	
(1a)	itself	is	nested	in	a	cross‐classification	of	the	corresponding	party‐to‐party‐combination	
(pjpd)	and	the	electoral	district	(canton	(c)).	Hence,	equation	(1a)	must	be	rewritten	as:	
	
ቆY௜௝ௗ ൌ ݈݋݃ ቀ ୮೔ೕଶ௕೏ቁቇሺ௣ೕ௣೏௖ሻ
	 (1b)	
	
Almost	the	same	applies	to	the	special	case	(2a):	
ቆY௜௝ ൌ ݈݋݃ ൬୮೔ೕଶ௕ೕ൰ቇሺ௣ೕ௖ሻ
	 (2b)	
	Since	we	assume	that	unobserved	features	from	all	these	levels	affect	a	candidate’s	ability	to	
exploit	his	personal	vote	potential,	our	empirical	models	include	separate	standard	error	
components.		
Table	1:	Standard	error	components	included	in	the	regressions	of	(1b)	and	(2b).	
	 Panachage	models Cumulation	models
Cantons	 uc uc
Parties	 upjpd	 up
Lists	 ujd(pjpdc)	 uj(pjc)
Candidates	 uij(pjpdc)	
Residual	 eijd(pjpdc)	 eij(pjc)
	
Taken	together,	this	leads	us	to	a	cross‐classified	random	effects	model	(Snijders/Bosker	1999)	
whose	coefficients	are	estimated	via	restricted	maximum	likelihood	(REML).	
Beside	the	variables	of	the	assumed	campaign	effects	as	discussed	above,	we	include	several	
additional	variables.	At	the	cantonal	level,	we	control	for	the	amount	of	lists	presented	to	the	
voter,	assuming	that	a	higher	amount	of	lists	increases	the	chances	for	a	voter	to	find	a	list	that	
matches	his	preferences,	which	thus	lowers	the	amount	of	personal	votes.	Furthermore,	we	
control	for	the	number	of	seats,	or	mandates,	per	canton	(or,	district).	Furthermore,	we	include	
two	variables	that	capture	whether	a	canton	has,	compared	to	the	previous	election	and	due	to	
its	demographic	development,	one	seat	more	or	less	to	occupy.	Although	these	variables	are	not	
supposed	to	be	directly	related	to	the	dependent	variable,	they	might	strongly	influence	the	
degree	of	competition	and	thus	the	level	of	electoral	campaigning	within	a	canton.	We	thus	
include	these	factors	in	order	to	account	for	a	potential	omitted	variable	bias	(see	below).	
At	the	level	of	parties	(or,	party‐	combinations	in	the	case	of	panachage),	we	account	for	the	
overall	vote	share	in	the	previous	elections	(2011)	of	the	party	the	candidate	belongs	to,	and	–	in	
the	case	of	the	panachage	models	–	also	for	the	2011	vote	share	of	the	party	receiving	a	
(panachage)	vote	(=	recipient).	In	case	of	the	panachage	models	where	candidates	receive	votes	
from	outside	their	own	list,	we	also	include	the	overall	vote	share	of	the	party	whose	list	is	used	
(donor)	in	order	to	add	an	“alien”	candidate	(which	goes	hand	in	hand	with	the	donor	party	
losing	a	vote).	Furthermore,	we	add	a	binary	variable	that	accounts	for	the	fact	whether	the	
donor	and	the	recipient	list	belong	to	the	same	party	or	not.5		
																																																													
5	In	Switzerland,	parties	are	allowed	to	run	on	several	lists	and	sublists	(i.e.	lists	with	female	candidates	
and	male	candidates	only,	lists	with	young	candidates,	etc.).		
At	the	level	of	lists	(or,	list‐combinations	in	the	case	of	panachage),	we	control	whether	a	
candidate	receiving	a	vote	(=recipient)	is	presented	on	the	main	or	the	junior	list	of	a	party	
(compared	to	other	lists	of	a	party,	such	as	Swiss	abroad,	grey	panthers,	etc.)	as	well	as	the	
number	of	mandates	won	by	the	party	in	2011	in	order	to	monitor	the	strength	of	the	recipient	
list	in	a	given	canton.	In	case	of	the	panachage	models,	we	include	exactly	the	same	variables	for	
the	donor	party,	i.e.	the	party	whose	list	was	chosen	and	where	an	external	candidate	was	added	
to.	Here,	we	assume	that	candidates	from	powerful	lists	are	likely	to	be	enlisted	on	other,	less	
powerful	lists.	In	addition,	we	control	for	the	order	of	the	recipient’s	list	(assuming	that	front	
lists	receive	more	attention)	and	whether	the	chosen	list	(donor)	disposes	of	free	spots,	which	
enhances	the	potential	for	cumulation	or	panachage	since	no	candidate	needs	to	be	replaced.	
Furthermore,	we	control	for	the	fact	that	parties	are	allowed	to	ally	with	other	parties	in	
“combined	lists”	(apparentments)	and	also	to	create	“sub‐lists,”	e.g.	for	young	or	female	
candidates	only.	Here,	we	assume	that	voters	are	more	likely	to	enclose	candidates	within	a	
combined	list.		
At	the	candidate	level,	we	control	for	a	large	set	of	potential	personal	vote	earning	attributes	
(Shugart	et	al.	2005).	One	group	of	variables	is	introduced	to	account	for	the	political	expertise	of	
a	candidate.	One	of	the	strongest	factors	found	in	virtually	all	studies	on	preference	voting	is	
incumbency	(Carson	et	al.	2007;	Cox	&	Katz	1996;	Gelman	&	King	1990;	Maddens	&	Put	2013;	
Put	&	Maddens	2015),	since	incumbents	dispose	of	traceable	political	experience	and	emanate	
familiarity.	Furthermore	and	for	a	similar	reason,	we	include	a	binary	variable	capturing	
whether	the	candidate	is	also	running	for	the	prestigious	second	chamber	of	the	Council	of	
States.	However,	political	experience	can	also	be	gained	at	the	local	level.	The	typical	career	of	a	
(Swiss)	politician	begins	at	the	local	and	ends	at	the	national	level.	Even	if	this	Ochsentour	
(drudgery),	as	it	is	called	in	Switzerland,	is	no	longer	as	widespread	as	it	was	in	the	20th	
century,	holding	a	political	office	at	the	local	level	can	be	a	sign	of	political	expertise.	
Additionally,	a	local	office	implies	local	roots	that	could	attract	voters	looking	for	candidates	
who	promise	representing	the	constituency	(Tavits	2010).	Therefore,	we	control	for	whether	a	
candidate	holds	a	political	office	at	the	local	or	cantonal	level.	Furthermore,	local	ties	may	be	
connected	to	constituency‐orientation	and	thus	bear	higher	incentives	for	voters	to	consider	a	
local	candidate	(Blais	et	al.	2003;	Tavits	2010),	which	is	why	we	also	consider	whether	a	
candidate	is	running	for	office	in	the	same	canton	where	his	hometown	is	located.	Last	but	not	
least,	a	candidate’s	personal	characteristics	may	influence	its	voting	potential,	since	voters	might	
strive	for	enhancing	descriptive	representation	(Mansbridge	1999;	Bühlmann	and	Schädel	
2012).	Therefore,	we	include	controls	for	gender,	age	and	profession	(farmers,	workers,	and	
academics).6		
Furthermore,	we	control	for	additional	factors	located	at	the	candidate	level:	Several	studies	
highlight	the	importance	of	ballot	position	(for	an	overview	see	Spierings	&	Jacobs	2014).	The	
position	on	the	party	list	has	proven	to	be	an	important	determinant	of	electoral	success,	in	
Switzerland	as	well	as	elsewhere	(e.g.,	Lutz	2010;	Tavits	2010).	Since	campaigning	is	strategic,	
i.e.	dependent	on	the	expected	chances	of	electoral	success,	we	need	to	identify	factors	that	
directly	affect	the	endogeneous	regressor	(campaigning)	without	directly	affecting	the	
dependent	variable,	in	order	to	preclude	the	problem	of	omitted	variable	bias	(Moon	2006).	One	
such	factor	is	whether	a	candidate	occupies	a	waiting‐list	position.	Here,	we	expect	candidates	
that	hold	the	position	on	the	list	that	would	signify	a	gain	in	seat	for	a	party	to	have	particularly	
strong	incentives	to	invest	in	his	campaign	since	his	chances	to	succeed	are	real	but	not	certain.	
As	an	example,	consider	the	Swiss	Populist	Party	in	the	canton	of	Zurich	who	held	11	seats	
during	the	2011/15	legislature.	Since	in	most	of	the	cantons,	the	order	of	the	candidates	is	
determined	by	their	political	experience	and	incumbency	status,	the	candidate	on	the	12th	
position	of	the	list	has	a	higher	incentive	to	gather	personal	votes	than	the	candidates	placed	
before	and	after	him.	
Results	
We	first	present	our	models	of	the	panachage	potential,	i.e.	determinants	of	preferential	votes	
received	from	outside	a	candidate’s	own	party	list.	Turning	to	our	control	variables	(Model	1,	
Table	2),	results	are	as	expected:	candidates	belonging	to	larger	parties	also	exhibit	a	higher	
panachage	potential	than	candidates	from	more	marginalized	parties	or	lists.	Furthermore,	
closeness	pays	out:	candidates	are	substantially	more	likely	to	be	added	to	other	lists	of	the	
same	party	or,	to	some	degree,	also	to	connected	lists.	We	also	find	the	assumed	effect	of	the	
ballot	position:	the	further	up	a	candidate	is	placed	in	the	list,	the	more	votes	she	received	from	
panachage.		Furthermore,	political	expertise	is	highly	valued	by	voters.	Incumbent	MPs	are	far	
more	likely	to	receive	panachage	votes	than	their	challengers.	Also	holding	a	political	office	on	
the	municipality	or	the	cantonal	level	bears	a	comparative	advantage	and	so	does	running	
simultaneously	for	the	more	prestigious	second	chamber,	the	Council	of	States.	Interestingly,	
women	and	younger	candidates	have	a	significantly	higher	panachage	potential	than	their	peers,	
presenting	a	first	hint	that	the	panachage	vote	also	serves	to	enhance	descriptive	representation.	
																																																													
6	In	the	so	called	„militia	system“	in	Switzerland	representatives	are	not	professional	politicians	but	they	
pursue	a	profession	beside	their	political	mandate.	Thus,	most	of	the	candidates	(and	even	incumbents)	
mention	their	occupation.	Of	course,	nobody	controls	if	the	candidates	really	practise	the	mentioned	job	
or	to	what	level.	There	are	even	mentioned	such	things	as	“politician”	or	“artist	of	live”.	However,	we	
argue	that	the	mention	of	an	occupation	is	an	important	selling	argument	for	a	candidate.	
Likewise,	farmers	are	far	more	likely	to	be	added	to	existing	lists,	while	the	contrary	applies	to	
workers,	although	this	relationship	is	weaker	and	only	marginally	significant.	Moreover,	
candidates	running	in	cantons	with	a	higher	number	of	seats	display	a	lower	panachage	
potential,	leaving	us	with	the	assumption	that	the	higher	the	number	of	candidates	to	be	elected,	
the	better	the	list	of	candidates	already	reflects	the	voters’	will	and	the	less	panachage	is	
necessary.	Last	but	not	least,	candidates	also	receive	significantly	more	panachage	votes	from	
lists	with	empty	lines.	Apparently,	voters	tend	to	maximize	their	voting	potential	by	adding	
additional	candidates	to	empty	spots	on	the	list.	
Table	2:	Determinants	of	panachage	success	
    Model 1 Model 2  Model 3
  Intercept  ‐5.449 (0.224)** ‐5.346 (0.23)**  ‐5.346 (0.229)**
Canton  No. of mandates  ‐0.051 (0.009)** ‐0.048 (0.008)**  ‐0.047 (0.008)**
  Additional mandate  0.191 (0.187)  0.186 (0.186)
  Mandate Reduction  ‐0.039 (0.149)  ‐0.031 (0.148)
  No. of lists  ‐0.002 (0.012) ‐0.010 (0.012)  ‐0.010 (0.012)
Party  Recipient: Vote share 2011  0.007 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)  0.002 (0.005)
  Donor: Vote share 2011  ‐0.030 (0.005)** ‐0.030 (0.005)**  ‐0.030 (0.005)**
  Same party  1.213 (0.184)** 1.198 (0.183)**  1.197 (0.183)**
List  Recipient: main  0.478 (0.041)** 0.410 (0.041)**  0.402 (0.041)**
  Recipient: junior  ‐0.077 (0.044)° ‐0.057 (0.043)  ‐0.049 (0.043)
  Recipient: position  ‐0.003 (0.002) ‐0.001 (0.002)  ‐0.001 (0.002)
  Recipient: No. of mandates 2011  0.088 (0.010)** 0.077 (0.010)**  0.076 (0.010)**
  Donor: main ‐0.591 (0.025)** ‐0.592 (0.025)**  ‐0.592 (0.025)**
  Donor: junior 0.146 (0.025)** 0.146 (0.025)**  0.146 (0.025)**
  Donor: No. of mandates 2011  ‐0.086 (0.008)** ‐0.086 (0.008)**  ‐0.086 (0.008)**
  Donor: No. of empty lines on ballot 0.049 (0.002)** 0.049 (0.002)**  0.049 (0.002)**
  Combined lists 0.237 (0.029)** 0.237 (0.029)**  0.236 (0.029)**
Candidate  Ballot position ‐0.018 (0.001)** ‐0.018 (0.001)**  ‐0.018 (0.001)**
  Waiting‐list position  ‐0.179 (0.078)*  ‐0.170 (0.078)*
  Incumbent  1.408 (0.042)** 1.240 (0.046)**  1.435 (0.054)**
  Age  ‐0.002 (0.001)* ‐0.002 (0.001)**  ‐0.002 (0.001)**
  Woman  0.106 (0.017)** 0.108 (0.017)**  0.109 (0.017)**
  Runs for Council of States  0.653 (0.054)** 0.521 (0.054)**  0.537 (0.054)**
  Holds political office on municipality level 0.157 (0.031)** 0.157 (0.030)**  0.157 (0.030)**
  Holds political office on cantonal level 0.340 (0.035)** 0.299 (0.035)**  0.278 (0.035)**
  Locally anchored  0.084 (0.017)** 0.079 (0.016)**  0.077 (0.016)**
  Academic  0.026 (0.019) 0.030 (0.019)  0.029 (0.019)
  Farmer  0.313 (0.043)** 0.346 (0.042)**  0.349 (0.042)**
  Worker  ‐0.072 (0.037)° ‐0.070 (0.036)°  ‐0.068 (0.036)°
Campaign  No. of advertisements  0.012 (0.002)**  0.023 (0.002)**
  Share of advertisements on front page 0.155 (0.062)*  0.146 (0.061)*
  Share of individual advertisements 0.158 (0.052)**  0.141 (0.052)**
  Share of advertisements in colour  0.156 (0.035)**  0.119 (0.036)**
  Share of externally funded advertisements ‐0.022 (0.043)  ‐0.040 (0.043)
  Share of testimonial advertisements 0.150 (0.089)°  0.123 (0.089)
  Share of event advertisements  0.262 (0.107)*  0.231 (0.107)*
  Negative campaigning  ‐0.117 (0.089)  ‐0.113 (0.088)
Interactions  (Incumbent)x(No. of advertisements)   ‐0.021 (0.003)**
Random effect  Cantonal‐Level 0.236 0.216   0.215
SDs  Party‐Level  0.636 0.636   0.635
  List‐Level  0.658 0.656   0.656
  Candidate‐Level  0.454 0.443   0.441
  Residual  0.608 0.608   0.608
Notes:	REML‐estimates	from	the	regression	of	log	panachage	success	on	different	measures.	Nobservations	=	94174,	
NCandidates	=	3788,	NList.‐combinations	=	9314,	NParty‐combinations	=	336,	NCantons	=	20;	**	99%;	*	95%;	°	90%.	
	
Turning	to	our	campaign	variables	(Model	2,	Table	2),	we	find	that	the	more	often	a	candidate	
was	presented	on	advertisements,	the	higher	his	panachage	potential.7	Also	the	additional	
campaign	variables	introduced	to	capture	the	visibility	of	a	candidate’s	campaign	(share	of	
coloured	ads	and	the	share	of	ads	presented	on	the	frontpage	of	a	newspaper)	prove	to	be	
significant.	Furthermore,	an	individualized	style	of	campaigning	apparently	makes	a	candidate	
more	attractive	for	voters	who	chose	another	party	list	than	the	candidate’s:	the	share	of	
externally	funded	campaign	ads	is	significantly	and	positively	related	to	the	panachage	potential.	
The	share	of	campaign	ads	displaying	a	candidate’s	name	together	with	the	invitation	to	a	
campaign	event	generates	additional	voter	potential,	too.	However,	displaying	local	rootedness	
by	letting	speak	testimonials	(i.e.	usually	potential	voters)	in	one’s	campaign	is	supposed	to	be	
only	marginally	significant.	Furthermore,	victims	of	negative	campaigning	do	not	necessarily	
have	to	fear	negative	effects:	although	the	postulated	relation	to	the	panachage	potential	is	
negative,	it	is	not	significant.			
In	model	3	of	Table	2,	we	interacted	the	incumbency	status	with	the	number	of	campaign	ads	in	
order	to	explore	whether	electoral	campaigning	pays	out	differently	for	challengers	and	
incumbents.	As	Figure	1	shows,	this	is	indeed	the	case.	While	incumbents	do	barely	seem	to	
profit	from	(extensive)	electoral	campaigning,	challengers	can.	In	this	sense,	our	results	concur	
with	evidence	from	the	U.S.	(e.g.,	Abramowitz	1991;	Jacobson	1978;	Moon	2006)	while	they	
stand	in	contrast	to	findings	from	Belgium	(Maddens	and	Put	2013).	As	discussed	above,	
Maddens	and	Put	(2013:	853)	trace	their	non‐finding	back	to	the	size	of	the	constituency:	in	
large	constituencies,	it	might	be	more	difficult	to	recall	all	incumbent	MPs,	while	it	is	easier	in	
smaller	constituencies	or	in	majoritarian	electoral	systems	with	single‐member	districts	such	as	
the	U.S.		The	average	Swiss	constituency	is,	with	7.7	seats	per	unit,	almost	half	as	big	as	the	
average	Belgium	constituency	(13.6).	By	interacting	the	challenger’s	campaign	effect	with	
district	size,	future	research	might	shed	more	light	on	this	matter.	
	 	
																																																													
7	Of	course,	our	models	run	the	risk	of	overestimating	the	campaign	effect	since	irrelevant	challengers	are	
included	as	well	(see	e.g.,	Maddens	&	Put	2013:		853).	Yet	we	also	ran	models	where	we	only	included	
candidates	who	were	on	display	of	at	least	one	campaign	ad	(Ncandidates=1001),	assuming	that	only	
potentially	relevant	challengers	invested	in	campaign	spending.	However,	results	did	not	change	
substantially	(results	available	on	request).	
Figure	1:	Effect	of	campaign	intensity	on	electoral	success	(panachage	exploitation)	
	
Notes:	This	figure	is	based	on	the	interaction	effect	included	in	Model	3,	displayed	in	Table	2.	Campaign	intensity	is	
captured	by	a	candidate’s	total	number	of	campaign	ads.	
	
In	the	second	set	of	models	we	explore	the	cumulation	potential	of	a	candidate,	i.e.	the	votes	he	
or	she	gets	from	his	own	party	list	(Table	3).	Here,	we	are	foremost	interested	in	the	differences	
between	intra‐	and	inter‐list	success.	Compared	to	the	panachage	models	(Table	2)	it	strikes	that	
women	and	young	candidates	are	not	more	likely	(although	also	not	less	likely)	to	be	cumulated	
than	their	peers.	Thus,	our	results	present	a	first	hint	that	voters	might	strive	for	descriptive	
representation	via	panachage:	seemingly,	there	are	many	voters	who	complete	their	lists	with	
women	and	young	candidates	aiming	at	improving	their	(under‐)representation	in	the	national	
parliament.	On	the	other	hand,	farmers	are	–	again	–	not	only	more	likely	to	receive	additional	
votes,	workers	are	also	significantly	less	likely	to	be	selected.	Furthermore,	being	an	academic	
seems	to	increase	the	electoral	success	in	terms	of	votes	received	from	cumulation.	All	in	all,	a	
candidate’s	profession	or	level	of	education	thus	seems	to	matter	somewhat	more	for	intra‐list	
competition.	
		
Table	3:	Determinants	of	cumulation	success	
    Model 1 Model 2  Model 3
  Intercept  ‐2.888 (0.306)** ‐2.636 (0.308)**  ‐2.635 (0.307)**
Canton  No. of mandates  ‐0.021 (0.013) ‐0.023 (0.012)°  ‐0.023 (0.012)°
  Additional mandate  0.478 (0.269)°  0.475 (0.268)°
  Mandate Reduction  ‐0.1 (0.213)  ‐0.096 (0.212)
  No. of lists  ‐0.005 (0.006) 0.029 (0.017)  0.029 (0.017)
Party  Vote share 2011  0.208 (0.052)** ‐0.007 (0.006)  ‐0.008 (0.006)
List  Main  0.157 (0.051)** 0.168 (0.053)**  0.164 (0.053)**
  Junior  0.010 (0.003)** 0.158 (0.051)**  0.162 (0.051)**
  Position  0.045 (0.004)** 0.01 (0.003)**  0.010 (0.003)**
  No. of empty lines on ballot  0.053 (0.016)** 0.044 (0.004)**  0.044 (0.004)**
  No. of mandates 2011  ‐0.010 (0.001)** 0.05 (0.016)**  0.050 (0.016)**
Candidate  Ballot position ‐0.005 (0.006) ‐0.010 (0.001)**  ‐0.010 (0.001)**
  Waiting‐list position  ‐0.138 (0.044)**  ‐0.135 (0.044)**
  Incumbent  0.614 (0.024)** 0.530 (0.026)**  0.591 (0.031)**
  Age  0.000 (0.000) ‐0.001 (0.000)  ‐0.001 (0.000)
  Woman  0.011 (0.010) 0.012 (0.010)  0.012 (0.010)
  Runs for Council of States  0.297 (0.031)** 0.228 (0.031)**  0.231 (0.031)**
  Holds political office on municipality level 0.074 (0.018)** 0.075 (0.017)**  0.076 (0.017)**
  Holds political office on cantonal level 0.179 (0.021)** 0.161 (0.021)**  0.155 (0.021)**
  Locally anchored  0.031 (0.010)** 0.030 (0.009)**  0.029 (0.009)**
  Academic  0.022 (0.011)° 0.024 (0.011)*  0.023 (0.011)*
  Farmer  0.068 (0.024)** 0.088 (0.024)**  0.089 (0.024)**
  Worker  ‐0.062 (0.021)** ‐0.060 (0.021)**  ‐0.060 (0.021)**
Campaign  No. of advertisements  0.005 (0.001)**  0.009 (0.002)**
  Share of advertisements on front page 0.093 (0.042)*  0.089 (0.042)*
  Share of individual advertisements 0.117 (0.033)**  0.109 (0.033)**
  Share of advertisements in colour  0.003 (0.025)  ‐0.007 (0.025)
  Share of externally funded advertisements 0.065 (0.026)*  0.057 (0.026)*
  Share of testimonial advertisements 0.120 (0.064)°  0.101 (0.064)
  Share of event advertisements  0.144 (0.066)*  0.134 (0.066)**
  Negative campaigning  0.042 (0.055)  0.046 (0.055)
Interactions  (Incumbent)x(No. of advertisements)   ‐0.007 (0.002)**
Random effect  Cantonal‐Level 0.348 0.315   0.312
SDs  Party‐Level  0.181 0.189   0.190
  List‐Level  0.269 0.269   0.270
  Residual  0.260 0.256   0.255
Notes:	REML‐estimates	from	the	regression	of	log	cumulation	success	on	different	measures.	NCandidates	=	3788,	NLists	=	
422,	NParties	=	20,	NCantons	=	20;	**	99%;	*	95%;	°	90%.	
	
In	terms	of	campaign	advertisements,	we	cannot	detect	strong	differences	between	the	two	sets	
of	models,	although	in	general,	the	campaign	effects	appear	to	be	slightly	less	certain.	Yet	
particularly	displaying	local	ties	by	inviting	voters	to	pre‐election	parties	or	by	including	
testimonials	to	promote	one’s	vote	seems	to	exert	less	an	effect	on	loyal	voters	than	on	voters	
who	choose	another	party	list	than	the	candidate	they	added	to	the	list.	The	same	holds	true	for	
one	aspect	of	the	visibility	of	a	candidate’s	campaign:	the	impact	of	coloured	advertisements	is	
less	important	for	cumulation	than	for	panachage.	Finally,	even	if	the	impact	is	not	significant,	a	
look	at	the	findings	for	the	negative	advertisements	is	noticeable	because	of	the	reversal	of	the	
sign.	While	negative	campaigning	tends	to	negatively	influence	panachage	success,	it	rather	is	
rewarding	for	intra‐party	choice.	We	tentatively	assume	that	it	is	the	most	extreme	candidates	of	
a	given	list	that	are	negatively	portrayed	by	other	parties.	It	is	these	candidates	however,	that	
most	attracts	the	own	voters.	Of	course,	the	results	are	not	significant	and	there	is	only	very	few	
negative	campaigning	in	Switzerland.	However,	given	the	stability	of	all	other	results	the	change	
of	sign	is	worth	noting.		
We	may	only	speculate	about	the	reasons	for	these	–	all	in	all	–	quite	small	differences.	One	
might	be	that,	given	the	–	on	average	–	rather	small	district	size	of	Swiss	cantons,	voters	already	
know	the	candidates	of	their	preferred	party	list	while	candidates	from	other	lists	still	have	the	
possibility	to	attract	an	alien	voters’	interest	by	making	themselves	known	via	(local)	electoral	
campaigning.	However	and	against	our	expectations,	individualized	campaigning	also	enhances	
the	cumulation	potential.	A	possible	reason	for	this	finding	might	be	the	way	we	operationalized	
our	variable.	Campaign	advertisements	sponsored	by	associations	might	not	necessarily	
undermine	the	intra‐list	popularity	of	a	candidate,	particularly	not	if	the	association	stands	
ideologically	close	to	the	party	list	chosen.	Here,	a	more	fine‐grained	operationalization	of	
individualized	campaigning	might	have	led	to	different	results.	
	
Discussion	
This	paper	follows	the	tradition	of	analysis	of	electoral	performance	in	answering	the	
fundamental	question	of	who	gets	elected.	The	open	list‐system	in	Switzerland	allows	for	both,	
gathering	additional	votes	from	inside	a	candidate’s	own	list	(intra‐list‐votes;	so	called	
cumulation),	as	well	as	additional	votes	from	outside	his	own	list	(inter‐list‐votes;	so	called	
panachage).	If	we	consider	choosing	a	list	as	the	ideological	act	of	voting,	the	analysis	of	the	
additional	votes	(due	to	cumulation	and/or	panachage)	allows	us	to	examine	the	voting	
preferences	controlling	for	ideological	affiliation.	In	this	sense,	we	ask	which	factors	besides	
ideology	voters	explicitly	or	implicitly	consider	to	be	important	when	selecting	their	candidates.	
More	specifically,	we	are	interested	in	the	effects	of	electoral	campaigning	on	the	voter	potential	
and	adopt	an	exploratory	approach	to	detect	potential	differences	between	campaign	effects	for	
cumulative	and	panachage	votes.	
Besides	the	potential	to	enrich	the	discussion	on	the	conditions	of	electoral	success	in	open‐list	
proportional	systems,	the	comparison	has	a	methodological	advantage.	Other	than	previous	
studies,	we	fully	exploit	the	data’s	potential	by	modelling	the	votes	of	an	individual	candidate	in	
relation	to	the	alternatives	a	voter	was	offered	on	the	same	as	well	as	on	other	party	lists.			
The	combination	of	our	unique	dataset	consisting	of	campaign	advertisements	published	in	
more	than	50	important	national	and	regional	newspapers	(Bühlmann	et	al.	2015)	with	the	
official	statistics	of	panachage	and	cumulation	(BFS	2016)	show	that	campaigning	indeed	is	an	
important	factor	for	increasing	the	probability	of	getting	a	panachage	or	a	cumulation	vote.	Not	
only	the	number	of	advertisements	but	also	their	content,	i.e.	whether	they	show	the	candidate	
alone	or	promote	an	event	to	get	to	know	the	candidate,	significantly	increase	both	kinds	of	
additional	votes.	These	factors	therefore	help	a	candidate	stand	out	against	her	party	colleagues	
as	well	as	against	candidates	from	other	lists.		
These	results	are	in	accordance	with	previous	studies	which	have	shown	that	stronger	
campaigning	activities	increase	the	familiarity	with	the	candidates	(Biersack	et	al.	1993,	
Bonneau	2007,	Jacobson	1990).	This	also	explains	the	higher	benefit	of	campaign	spending	for	
challengers	compared	to	incumbents:	the	former	are	less	well	known	and	can	thus	introduce	
themselves	via	campaigning.	Campaigning	thus	allows	voters	to	look	beyond	what	they	already	
know,	i.e.	to	consider	alien	lists	and	less	familiar	candidates.		
To	some	extent,	however,	our	results	also	challenge	hitherto	findings	or	our	own	expectations.	
We	highlight	three	points:		
(1) While	the	result	concerning	the	different	impact	of	campaigning	for	incumbents	and	
challengers	concur	with	findings	from	the	US	elections,	they	deviate	from	findings	from	
Belgium	(Maddens	et	al.	2006)	or	Brazil	(Samuels	2001).	The	differences	between	Belgium	/	
Brazil	and	the	US	cannot	fully	be	explained	by	the	voting	system,	given	that	Belgium	and	
Brazil	as	well	as	Switzerland	are	characterized	as	open‐list	PR	systems.	Since	the	country	
studies	differ	in	several	terms,	such	as	district	size	or	operationalization	of	our	campaign	
variable,	we	refrain	from	attempts	to	explain	these	differences	at	this	point.	Nevertheless,	
these	results	claim	for	further	investigation,	at	the	national	as	well	as	at	the	international	
level.		
(2) We	did	not	detect	large	differences	of	campaign	influence	when	comparing	votes	received	
from	panachage	(inter‐list	competition)	to	the	ones	received	from	cumulation	(intra‐list	
competition).	Yet	again,	it	is	too	early	to	draw	definitive	conclusions.	Alternative	measures	
of	the	content	of	a	campaign,	for	example	as	regards	the	degree	of	individualized	
campaigning,	might	have	led	to	different	results.	Furthermore,	district	size	might	make	a	
difference:	while	with	increasing	district	size,	it	becomes	more	difficult	to	remember	all	
candidates	from	a	chosen	list,	it	might	become	even	more	difficult	to	remember	“alien”	
candidates	(which	makes	it	comparatively	easier	for	the	latter	to	make	themselves	known	
via	campaigning).			
(3) Yet	the	importance	of	having	the	choice	to	add	candidates	from	the	selected	as	well	as	
candidates	from	alien	lists	was	demonstrated	for	other	non‐campaign	related	factors.	Most	
interesting,	young	or	female	candidates	get	significantly	more	panachage	votes	than	older	
or	male	candidates,	while	there	are	no	such	differences	concerning	cumulation	votes.	Many	
voters	thus	actively	search	for	young	or	female	candidates	on	alien	lists	to	complete	the	list	
of	their	first	(ideological)	choice.	We	assume	that	this	can	be	attributed	to	the	
underrepresentation	of	such	candidates	on	most	main	lists.	This	finding	shows	one	
advantage	of	the	fully	open	list	system	in	Switzerland.	When	voters	are	allowed	to	choose	
among	candidates	not	only	from	their	selected	list	but	among	any	candidate	from	any	list,	
they	benefit	from	the	advantages	of	both,	the	candidate	centred	majoritarian	as	well	as	the	
ideology	centred	proportional	system.	Such	a	system	seemingly	allows	for	both,	descriptive	
as	well	as	ideological	representation.		
Our	contribution	suggests	several	avenues	for	improvement.	First,	while	we	included	a	fair	
amount	of	important	factors,	there	still	are	some	aspects	that	are	not	yet	considered	in	our	
models.	These	are	additional	ideological	factors:	it	would	be	interesting	to	control	for	the	
ideological	distance	between	the	recipient	and	donor	lists	(although	we	already	slightly	
approach	this	by	controlling	for	list	apparentments)	as	well	as	for	the	main	issues	of	an	election	
campaign.	This	would	offer	a	possibility	to	compare	the	impact	of	ideological	as	well	as	non‐
ideological	factors	on	personal	votes	received.	Second,	it	would	be	worthwhile	to	explore	the	
hypothesized	influence	of	district	size	on	the	impact	of	electoral	campaigns,	as	for	example	by	
comparing	the	campaign	effects	for	the	elections	to	the	First	and	the	Second	Chamber	–	or	
interacting	campaign	effects	with	district	size.	Third,	we	captured	electoral	campaigning	via	
advertisements	placed	in	national	and	regional	newspapers.	Although	in	Switzerland,	
newspapers	offer	still	an	important,	if	not	the	most	important,	arena	for	electoral	campaigning,	
other	channels	of	campaigning	gain	in	importance.	Most	notably,	social	media	(see	e.g.,	Spierings	
&	Jacobs	2014)	offers	the	opportunity	for	engaging	in	a	new	type	of	campaigning	that	may	not	
only	be	characterized	by	lower	costs	but	as	well	by	a	higher	intensity	of	political	advertising.		
Thus,	more	research	is	needed	to	investigate	the	interplay	between	ideology,	candidate	factors	
and	campaign	strategies	for	vote	choice	and	electoral	success.	Nevertheless,	our	paper	shows	
that	having	the	opportunity,	many	voters	pick	their	cherries	not	only	from	one	but	from	
different	trees.				
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